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INTRODUCTION
Several months before the 2012 presidential election, a Time magazine cover featured the faces of twenty Latinos1 and boldly pro2
claimed that Latinos would “pick the next President.” In big white
3
lettering, the cover read, “Yo Decido” (I Decide). After President
Barack Obama’s reelection, discussion about the Latino vote remained at the center of a national dialogue. Headlines reported that
Latinos had turned out in record numbers and had significantly in4
creased their share of the total voters. Commentators warned that
the losing Republican Party could no longer afford to ignore or alienate Hispanics in national races and must instead pay greater atten5
tion to the interests of Latino communities. An official at the National Council of La Raza, a Hispanic organization involved in
registration campaigns, powerfully said, “Latino voters confirmed un-
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J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2011, Columbia College, Columbia University. I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Dorothy E. Roberts, for her guidance and insightful feedback. I would also like to thank the editors and
Board of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law for their assistance
throughout the editing process.
This Comment uses the terms “Latino” and “Hispanic” interchangeably.
TIME, Mar. 5, 2012.
Id.
See, e.g., Julia Preston & Fernanda Santos, A Record Latino Turnout, Solidly Backing Obama,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at P13; Donna St. George & Brady Dennis, Growing Share of Hispanic Voters Helped Push Obama to Victory, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2012, available at
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-07/politics/35505702_1_hispanic-voterslatino-votes-latino-decisions; MARK HUGO LOPEZ & PAUL TAYLOR, PEW HISPANIC CTR., PEW
RESEARCH CTR., LATINO VOTERS IN THE 2012 ELECTION 4–5 (2012), http://www.
pewhispanic.org/2012/11/07/latino-voters-in-the-2012-election (reporting that Latinos
made up ten percent of the electorate, up from nine percent in 2008, and were a growing
share of voters in key battleground states of the 2012 election).
Preston & Santos, supra note 4, at P13 (discussing how Latino leaders believe that Mitt
Romney’s weak showing exemplifies why Hispanics can no longer be ignored during national campaigns).
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equivocally that the road to the White House passes through Latino
6
neighborhoods.” It looked to be the “Year of the Latino.”
Despite Latinos’ growing political influence, however, discrimination against Latinos persists. In 2011, an Associated Press poll found
that fifty-seven percent of non-Hispanic whites harbored anti7
Hispanic sentiment, and a poll conducted by the Pew Research Center found that sixty-one percent of Latinos believed discrimination
8
against Hispanics to be a “major problem.” The Pew Research Center also reported in 2010 that, when asked which of the various racial
and ethnic groups were frequently the targets of discrimination,
9
Americans answered Hispanics more often than any other group.
W.E.B. DuBois wrote in 1903, “The problem of the Twentieth
10
Century is the problem of the color line . . . .” Today, the color line
has expanded beyond the white-black racial dichotomy, and Latinos
stand at the forefront of our national discussion about race, politics,
and society. In this discussion and amid evidence of prejudice, a central legal question arises: Does the Supreme Court’s current analytical framework for the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
11
Clause adequately protect the Latino population from discriminato12
ry laws and state action? This Comment concludes that the Court’s
case law about the suspect class status of Latinos is unclear and unlikely to effectively protect Latinos from stigmatizing legislation. This
Comment will provide a new analytical framework that can guide the
Court in bringing clarity to the issue and ultimately protect Latinos’
civil rights.
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Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Sonya Ross & Jennifer Agiesta, Poll: Majority Harbor Prejudice Against Blacks and Hispanics,
NBC LATINO (Oct. 27, 2012, 3:38 PM), http://nbclatino.com/2012/10/27/poll-majorityharbor-prejudice-against-blacks-and-hispanics.
PEW RESEARCH CTR., LATINOS PERCEPTION OF DISCRIMINATION (2010), http://www.
pewresearch.org/daily-number/latinos-perceptions-of-discrimination.
PEW RESEARCH CTR., DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HISPANICS (2010), http://www.
pewresearch.org/daily-number/discrimination-against-hispanics (reporting that twentythree percent of Americans say Hispanics are frequent targets of discrimination, compared to only eighteen percent of Americans who say the same thing about African Americans).
W.E.B DUBOIS, SOULS OF BLACK FOLK, at xv (Dover Thrift Ed. 1994) (1903).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”).
Technically, equal protection applies to the federal government through judicial interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and to state and local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500
(1954) (“We hold that racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia
is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.”).
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Part I begins by briefly examining the development of heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause for laws that discriminate
based on racial and national origin classifications. Part I finds that
the classification of Latinos as a “suspect group” meriting such scrutiny in fact rests on uncertain legal ground due to the Court’s confusing case law, aggravating historical factors, and current demographic
patterns. It reveals that while the legal conclusions remain muddled
about whether Latinos are a suspect class, the public perception of
Latinos as a distinct population group has grown. This Part also explains why the application of heightened scrutiny to classifications of
various national origin groups, like Mexican Americans or Cuban
Americans, is insufficient to adequately protect the civil rights of Latinos as a broader population group. Part I thus advocates that the
Court solidify the constitutional status of the broader Latino classification as a suspect class.
Part II examines how the Court, when determining which racial
and ethnic categorizations merit suspect class analysis, often describes
race as a purely biological concept. Part II argues, however, that race
is not a biological concept, but is instead a social concept. It asserts
that if the biological conception of race continues to prevail in suspect class determinations, then it is unlikely that Latinos, an incredibly diverse population, will fit within a coherent racial classification.
As a result, the constitutional status of the Latino classification will
remain in jeopardy. Part II thus urges the Court to embrace the scientific and anthropological research showing that race is in fact a socially constructed concept. It maintains that the Court must analyze
race in a new and sensible way that reflects its social, instead of biological, foundations. A new framework will not only align the Court
with modern science, but it will also subsequently better accommodate the Latino categorization.
Part III introduces such a new analytical framework, relying on the
13
work of anthropologist Edward Said in his seminal work Orientalism.
Said explains how the Western world developed an “us” versus “them”
political dichotomy when conceptualizing the Middle East, resulting
in the creation of the foreign and inferior “Other.” Part III proposes
that the Court borrow this “us” versus “them” framework to rework
suspect class analysis to ask whether a group has become “otherized”
by the dominant Anglo-American society to an extent that subsequently warrants suspect class analysis and heightened scrutiny. By
asking this new question, the Court will develop an analysis that
13

EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978).
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properly foregoes a biological discussion, adequately acknowledges
the social construction of race, and ultimately reflects the social and
political reality of the way that discrimination operates in the United
States. This new “otherization” framework will also ensure that Latinos, a population group often described as outsiders who do not
speak English and who do not share American values, are sufficiently
protected through the Equal Protection Clause. Part III concludes by
addressing questions and critiques about the framework’s implementation.
I. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE LATINO CLASSIFICATION FOR SUSPECT
CLASS ANALYSIS AND THE NEED FOR ITS CLARIFICATION
A. Introduction to Suspect Class Analysis
The Court first articulated that it would apply heightened scrutiny
to laws that discriminated against various racial or national origin
14
groups in Korematsu v. United States, which infamously upheld the
constitutionality of the relocation of Japanese Americans during
15
World War II. The Court declared,
[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them
to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justi16
fy the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.

In footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,17 the Court
identified a central reason why strict scrutiny is appropriate for racial
and national origin classifications. It explained that “prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,” and thus, a
18
“more searching judicial inquiry” is needed.
It is now well-settled that racial and national origin classifications
will be permitted under strict scrutiny only if the government can
meet the heavy burden of demonstrating that the discrimination is
19
necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. The racial
14
15
16
17
18
19

323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Id. at 218–19.
Id. at 216.
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
Id. at 153 n.4.
See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273–74 (1986) (laying out the
Court’s two-prong test for examining government preferences based on racial or ethnic
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and national origin groups so singled out are considered “suspect
classes,” and belonging to such a racial and/or national origin group
20
constitutes an immutable characteristic. Applying strict scrutiny to
racially discriminatory laws will be referred to simply as suspect class
analysis in this Comment.
B. Problematic Case Law on Whether Latinos Constitute a Suspect Class
The first Supreme Court case to apply suspect class analysis to a
21
segment of the Latino population was Hernandez v. Texas. In this
case, the Court unanimously reversed a Mexican American petitioner’s murder conviction on equal protection grounds, finding a dis22
criminatory application of state law. Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for the Court, found evidence that persons of Mexican descent
were a separate class, distinct from whites, in Jackson County, Texas
and found that there had been a systematic exclusion of members of
23
this class from jury service. Instead of finding a per se suspect class
classification, however, the Court explained that “[w]hether such a
24
group exists within a community is a question of fact.” It cited testimony by local Jackson County residents that the community distinguished between “white” and “Mexican,” evidence of mandated
school segregation, the existence of a sign at a local restaurant reading “No Mexicans Served,” and the existence of a sign above the
men’s toilets in a local courthouse saying “Hombres Aqui” (“Men
25
Here”).

20

21
22

23

24
25

criteria: first, that any racial classification “must be justified by a compelling governmental interest” and second, that the “means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose
must be narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal” (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (explaining that sex is an immutable characteristic, like race and national origin, as it is a characteristic determined
solely by the “accident of birth”).
347 U.S. 475 (1954).
Id. at 482 (“[Defendant’s] only claim is the right to be indicted and tried by juries from
which all members of his class are not systematically excluded—juries selected from
among all qualified persons regardless of national origin or descent. To this much, he is
entitled by the Constitution.”).
Id. at 480–82 (“Circumstances or chance may well dictate that no persons in a certain
class will serve on a particular jury or during some particular period. But it taxes our credulity to say that mere chance resulted in there being no members of this class among the
over six thousand jurors called in the past 25 years.”).
Id. at 478.
Id. at 479–80 (highlighting the various fact-specific considerations that allowed the Court
to determine that persons of Mexican descent constitute a class in Jackson County distinct from whites).
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The Court’s holding was thus fact-specific and turned on the particular social stigmas and attitudes about the Mexican Americans in
26
Jackson County. One scholar notes that “[w]hereas the Court had
historically understood (and accepted without question) the protected status of African Americans in terms of race, in Hernandez the
Court relied on the dynamics of variable ‘community prejudices’ to
hold that under certain circumstances,” Mexican Americans could be
27
a suspect class. It is also particularly noteworthy that this case was
not described as a “race” case as neither the State of Texas nor the
defendant argued that Mexican Americans were non-white for pur28
poses of the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, although Hernandez
marks the first case in which the Court recognized that persons of
Mexican descent constitute a suspect class, the case did not create a
new per se racial classification under the Fourteenth Amendment.
29
White v. Regester, a case decided twenty years after Hernandez, involved an equal protection challenge by both Mexican Americans
and blacks to a Texas legislative redistricting plan, and it shows the
30
persistence of a fact-specific inquiry for Mexican Americans. The
Court affirmed the lower court’s finding that Mexican Americans
were a suspect class by reviewing the historic and present discriminatory conditions of the Mexican American community in Bexar Coun31
ty. The black plaintiffs, however, were not required to make such a
32
showing of local discrimination, as the Court bypassed an analysis
about the specific social position of blacks in the districts in question.
Although the Court once again struck down a law in order to protect
Mexican Americans from discrimination, the status of this community
for purposes of equal protection analysis continued to be “dependent
on extrinsic attitudinal factors that require demonstration in each
33
case.”
Hernandez was then apparently, yet problematically, extended in
34
Keyes v. School District No. 1, which considered the segregation of

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Jamie L. Crook, From Hernandez v. Texas to the Present: Doctrinal Shifts in the Supreme
Court’s Latina/o Jurisprudence, 11 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 19, 19–20 (2008).
Id.
Id. at 35 (explaining that although this case was brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, neither side argued that “Mexican Americans were non-white”).
412 U.S. 755 (1973).
See id. at 765–69.
Id. at 767–69.
Richard Delgado & Vicky Palacios, Mexican Americans as a Legally Cognizable Class Under
Rule 23 and the Equal Protection Clause, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 393, 396 (1975).
Id.
413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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Hispanic students in the Denver, Colorado school system.35 Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr., writing for the Court, stated, “We have held
that Hispanos constitute an identifiable class for purposes of the
36
Fourteenth Amendment.” Despite its seeming definitiveness, this
statement proves to be extremely problematic for two reasons. First,
the only Supreme Court precedent cited in support of this proposi37
tion was Hernandez. However, Hernandez’s case-by-case, fact-specific
inquiry that proves central to its holding is unacknowledged in this
38
brief citation. Second, Hernandez only discussed the social position
of Mexican Americans, but in citing Hernandez, Keyes uses the ambiguous and potentially broader term of “Hispanos.” Justice Brennan
notes the ambiguity of the term in a footnote, writing, “‘Hispano’ is
the term used by the Colorado Department of Education to refer to a
person of Spanish, Mexican, or Cuban heritage. . . . In the Southwest,
the ‘Hispanos’ are more commonly referred to as ‘Chicanos’ or ‘Mex39
ican-Americans.’” The Court used the more inclusive definition of
“Hispanos,” as did the Colorado Department of Education, representing an unexplained broadening of Hernandez’s holding beyond a localized Mexican American community to include a generalized population of Cubans, Spaniards, and possibly other ethnic groups. Thus,
as a scholar noted, the Court “afforded Hernandez v. Texas a stronger
40
reading than that decision actually warranted.”
Keyes’s problematic reliance on Hernandez is further exemplified
by the disagreement in the Eleventh Circuit about the meaning of
41
Keyes. In Valle v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections, involving
habeas review, the circuit court discussed Keyes and denied a rehear42
ing en banc of a Florida Supreme Court case. The court had previously concluded that the term “Latin American” failed to represent a
single cognizable class for equal protection analysis and that such a
conclusion was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

35
36
37
38

39
40
41
42

Id. at 191.
Id. at 197.
See id. Five other cases were cited in support of the proposition, but all of these additional cases were lower court decisions.
See Steven Harmon Wilson, Some Are Born White, Some Achieve Whiteness, and Some Have
Whiteness Thrust upon Them: Mexican Americans and the Politics of Racial Classification in the
Federal Judicial Bureaucracy, Twenty-Five Years After Hernandez v. Texas, 25 CHICANOLATINO L. REV. 201, 202 (2005) (noting that Hernandez is often “cited but passed over
quickly”).
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 195–96 n.6.
Crook, supra note 26, at 41.
478 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1326–27.
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federal law as it stood in 1985, when the case was originally decided.43
In denying the rehearing, a concurring judge commented that Keyes
had not clearly established in 1973 that “Latin Americans were a constitutionally cognizable group” because “each case the Supreme
Court cited in support of its conclusion that Hispanos were an identi44
fiable class referred only to persons of Mexican descent.” A dissenting judge disagreed, writing that the Supreme Court had legitimately
chosen to use the broader term “Hispanos” instead of the limited
term “Mexican American” in Keyes, thereby making “Latin Ameri45
cans” a cognizable class. Simply, Keyes remained suspect to the circuit.
The Supreme Court has not clarified Keyes’s scope, as it has never
cited the case to support a finding that any Latino population group
constitutes a suspect class for equal protection purposes. In addition,
even in its continued citations to Hernandez, the Supreme Court re46
mains inconsistent. While Castaneda v. Partida, Regents of the Universi47
ty of California v. Bakke, and B.P.O.E. Lodge No. 2043 of Brunswick v.
48
Ingraham indicated that Hernandez’s holding applied to Mexican
Americans, a parenthetical in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. curiously suggested that Hernandez instead involved discrimination
49
against a broader group of Hispanics. The puzzle about Hernandez
and Keyes’s legacy remains.
C. Aggravating Factors That Complicate Conclusions About Latinos’
Constitutional Status
These citation anomalies, however, are not the only factors that
create a question about when Latino population groups should be
found to constitute a suspect class under the Fourteenth Amendment
and about which ethnic population groups should be included.
Three other considerations also aggravate the confusion. The first is
a theoretical argument that because the “Civil War amendments were
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id.
Id. at 1327 (Wilson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1329–30 (Barkett, J., dissenting). Note that the judge did not find a difference between the terms “Hispanos” and “Latin Americans.”
430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977) (“[I]t is no longer open to dispute that Mexican-Americans are
a clearly identifiable class.”).
438 U.S. 265, 292 (1978) (indicating in a parenthetical that Hernandez involved Mexican
Americans).
411 U.S. 924, 927 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (describing that Hernandez involved
discrimination against persons of Mexican descent).
488 U.S. 469, 523 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (indicating in a parenthetical that Hernandez involved Hispanics more generally).
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aimed at redressing injustices to blacks, principally slavery,” the Equal
Protection Clause conceptualizes a “black-white” racial binary that
50
becomes ill suited to protect other racial minority groups. Simply,
the historical black-white paradigm does not incorporate the experi51
ences of Latinos and other minority groups. Courts thus have difficulty using the Equal Protection Clause to redress discrimination
against non-black minority groups when that discrimination takes a
52
form that has not been traditionally experienced by blacks. This
implication is particularly relevant for Latinos in the context of discrimination based on their use of the Spanish language and their
immigration status. As Professor Angela Harris wrote, “[T]he assumption that rights and especially remedies crafted for a biracial society will fit a multiracial” society has become “increasingly problematic” as the United States becomes a nation of many minorities,
53
including Latinos, “rather than a nation of black and white.” Finding Latinos to be a suspect class may require new judicial investigations and evaluations.
A second consideration as to why the courts have found it difficult
to define Hispanics as a suspect class drawn by racial lines is because
54
of the supposed inherent racial instability of this population group.
Hispanics’ fluctuating racial status on the United States Census acutely demonstrates what some scholars consider to be Latinos’ “racial
55
indeterminacy.” The census first began counting Mexicans in 1930
56
and made “Mexican” a separate race category. The Census Bureau,
however, eliminated this category in the 1940s and instead created a
57
category for “the White population of Spanish mother tongue.”
This new category required interviewers “to report all Mexicans as
50

51

52
53

54
55
56
57

Richard Delgado, Rodgrigo’s Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical Scholarship,
and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1181, 1190 (1997) (reviewing LOUISE ANN
FISCH, ALL RISE: REYNALDO G. GARZA, THE FIRST MEXICAN AMERICAN FEDERAL JUDGE
(1996)).
Enid Trucios-Haynes, Why “Race Matters:” LatCrit Theory and Latina/o Racial Identity, 12 LA
RAZA L.J. 1, 8 (2000–2001) (“Racial inequality in this country is assessed through the
prism of the Black-White paradigm and Latinas/os are rendered invisible in this construct of race relations.”).
See Crook, supra note 26, at 28–29 (noting how the black-white paradigm marginalizes the
struggles of non-black minority groups such as Latinos).
Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in PostCivil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 852 (1997) (quoting ANGELA HARRIS, WHAT WE
TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT RACE (1997)).
See Crook, supra note 26, at 32 (describing the unwieldy nature of Latino identity).
Id.
Patricia Palacios Paredes, Note, Latinos and the Census: Responding to the Race Question, 74
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 146, 151 (2005).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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white, unless the interviewer determined [that] the person was defi58
nitely Indian or another non-white race.” In 1980, the census began
asking all respondents whether they were “Of Spanish/Hispanic
origin or descent,” and since 2000, the census has asked respondents
to identify themselves ethnically as “Hispanic or Latino” or “Not His59
panic or Latino,” and racially as one or more of six race categories.
These racial categories are American Indian or Alaska Native; Asian;
Black or African American; Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Is60
lander; White; or “Some Other Race.” Despite the Census Bureau’s
attempts to separate Latino ethnicity from racial identity, many Latinos indicate in the “Some Other Race” category that they racially
61
identify as “Latino.”
Thus, the evolution in how the United States government classifies Latinos and the dynamics of Latino self-identification make it unsurprising that the courts have been reticent to definitively create a
per se suspect class for the Latino “race” as it has done for African
Americans. The result of this “Latina/o indeterminate racial group
identity,” as argued by Professor Enid Trucios-Haynes, has more
broadly been that discrimination against Latinos has been ignored
62
and remained unredressed. Accordingly, the history of both the
Fourteenth Amendment and the census demonstrate why finding a
definitive suspect racial classification for minority groups as a judicial
remedy for discrimination has been a poor fit for Latinos.
A more modern phenomenon becomes a third aggravating factor
to the confusion about Latinos’ constitutional status under the Equal
Protection Clause. Persons of Mexican descent historically made up
63
an enormous percentage of the Latino population, and thus a discussion by the courts about the status of Mexican Americans, as opposed to a discussion about the status of a broader Latino classifica64
tion, was sensible. As immigration from a broad range of countries
58
59
60
61
62
63

64

John A. Powell, A Minority-Majority Nation: Racing the Population in the Twenty-First Century,
29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1395, 1408 (2002).
Crook, supra note 26, at 33.
Id.
Id.; Paredes, supra note 56, at 152.
Trucios-Haynes, supra note 51, at 33 (arguing that Latinos’ identity encourages discrimination against them).
See U.S. Hispanic Population Is Up 34% Since 1980, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1988, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/07/us/us-hispanic-population-is-up-34-since1980.html (stating that Mexicans make up the largest group of Hispanics in the United
States).
See EILEEN PATTEN, PEW RESEARCH CTR, STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF THE FOREIGN-BORN
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at tbl.8 (2012), http://www.pewhispanic.org/
2012/02/21/statistical-portrait-of-the-foreign-born-population-in-the-united-states-2010
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in Central and South America continues into the twenty-first century,
however, the diversity within the Latino classification will continue to
increase. While the rates of immigration from Mexico have slightly
decreased from a period before 1990 to after 2000, the immigration
rates from other countries in Central America and South America
65
have moderately increased. These dynamic immigration patterns
quickly increase the number of naturalized and U.S.-born citizens
66
considered to be Latinos who are not of Mexican descent. The
Mexican American classification can no longer be considered a standin for a Hispanic classification. Case law, notably not citing to Keyes,
that assumes Hispanics to be a cognizable class based on evidence associated almost solely with Mexican Americans is thus of weak precedential value. This case law inadequately supports a finding that Latinos, a group made up of citizens from nearly twenty countries, are
truly a single suspect class.
Examples of this questionable case law from the Supreme Court
67
68
are Bush v. Vera and League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry.
69
In Bush, the Court “simply accepted” that Hispanics constituted a
racial group, and it struck down a majority Hispanic district as uncon70
stitutional racial gerrymandering. In Perry, the Court treated Latinos as a racial group able to assert a violation of the Voting Rights Act
71
in a redistricting case. Crucially, however, both of these cases came
from Texas, a state in which Mexican Americans are essentially the
72
only Latino subpopulation. There is scant evidence in either case
that the Supreme Court conceptualized its Hispanic classification as
encompassing minority groups besides Mexican Americans in the
Texas counties. In addition, the Ninth Circuit, again not citing to
Keyes, announced that “Hispanics have long been recognized as a ‘dis73
tinctive’ group in the community,” but it cited principally to Cas-

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

73

(noting the extraordinary size of the Mexican-American population when compared to
the size of other Latino ethnic groups in 1988).
Id.
See id. at tbl.6.
517 U.S. 952 (1996).
548 U.S. 399 (2006).
Valle v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 478 F.3d 1326, 1331 (11th Cir. 2007) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
Vera, 517 U.S. at 973–95.
Perry, 548 U.S. at 427.
See PEW RESEARCH CTR., HISPANIC POPULATION IN SELECT U.S. METROPOLITAN AREAS,
2010 (2013), http://www.pewhispanic.org/hispanic-population-in-select-u-s-metropolitanareas (showing that the Latino population in San Antonio, Texas, for example, is over
ninety percent Mexican).
United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 941 (9th Cir. 2005).
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taneda, a case that only considered the status of Mexican Americans.74
Thus, while facially supporting the idea that Hispanics are conclusively a suspect class, these Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit cases show
that such a finding is in fact still unsettled.
D. National Origin Classifications Are Insufficient and the Court Should
Definitively Find Latinos to be a Suspect Class
In 1989, the Second Circuit, despite finding that Hispanics were a
cognizable class, admitted that “issues may arise as to whether a particular individual is properly included within the category of ‘Hispan75
ics.’” Now, twenty-five years later, such issues have come to the fore.
The problematic citations to and extension of Hernandez, the theoretical incongruence of the Equal Protection Clause remedies for nonblack minorities, the historical “racial flexibility” of the Latino population, and the increasing diversity within the Latino population have
muddled the conclusions about whether Latinos in fact constitute a
suspect class and about who is included in this racial or ethnic classification. While these conclusions have become increasingly ambiguous, the public perception of Latinos as a unified and established mi76
nority group has dramatically increased. Sociologist Cristina Mora
has researched what she calls the “institutionalization of Hispanic
77
panethnicity in the United States.” She explains that in the 1960s
and 1970s, the Latino communities were geographically, culturally,
and politically disparate, but by 1990, through a congruence of vari78
Today, a “netous factors, a united Hispanic identity emerged.
worked chorus of state, market and civic organizations . . . loudly insist on the real existence of the Hispanic vote, the Hispanic market
79
and the Hispanic community.” Other scholars have also remarked
that Latinos are consistently considered a concrete racial group in
“public policy debates about government benefits, immigration law,
80
[and] affirmative action.” This juxtaposition of confusing Supreme
Court precedent about whether Latinos constitute a cognizable class

74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 483–85 (1977) (describing how the case involved discrimination against Mexican Americans in the grand jury selection process).
United States v. Alvarado, 891 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 497
U.S. 543 (1990).
See G. Cristina Mora, Hispanic Panethnicity, BERKELEY REV. LATIN AM. STUD. 7 (2011–2012),
http://clas.berkeley.edu/Publications/Review/Fall2011/pdf/BRLAS Fall2011-Mora.pdf.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 11.
Trucios-Haynes, supra note 51, at 17.
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with a clear social perception of an established minority group is
troubling. The Court ought to resolve this tension by clarifying its
case law.
Critics may argue, however, that the social perception of Latinos
as a definite minority group is not a proper legal argument to support a finding that Latinos are a recognizable suspect class under the
law. Critics may further point to the fact that under current Equal
Protection Doctrine, the classifications of various national origin
groups (i.e., Puerto Rican Americans, Cuban Americans, etc.) that
would likely be included in the Latino category already receive
heightened scrutiny based on these national origin classifications.
Thus, they argue, a new legal classification for Latinos is unnecessary.
Even without establishing a Latino classification, it must be acknowledged that courts will apply heightened scrutiny to legislation that
explicitly creates disparate treatment for Latin American national
81
origin communities. But it is in the context of facially race neutral
laws, however, that the solidification and clarification of the broader
Latino classification becomes legally important. The Supreme Court
82
announced in Washington v. Davis that laws that are facially neutral
as to race and national origin receive heightened scrutiny only if
83
there is proof of a discriminatory purpose. Proving a discriminatory
purpose behind a facially race neutral law will become relevant for
Latinos, particularly in cases challenging the constitutionality of redistricting plans and the enforcement of English-only laws, as both of
84
these types of legislation are considered race neutral.
There are two problems with proving this discriminatory purpose
without the solidification of the Latino classification. First, without a
broad Latino classification, each national origin group must sue separately to ensure the application of heightened scrutiny. This creates
repetitive and inefficient litigation. Second, and more importantly,
81

82
83
84

See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.”); see also
Jenny Rivera, An Equal Protection Standard for National Origin Subclassifications: The Context
That Matters, 82 WASH. L. REV. 897, 918 (2007) (“[D]ifferential treatment based
on . . . any national origin race surrogate that appears to act like a race marker is subjected to strict scrutiny.”).
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Id. at 242.
The Court has made clear that “[e]lectoral district lines are ‘facially race neutral.’” Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007) (quoting
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Language
classifications have also been considered “invariably facially race-neutral.” Andrew P.
Averbach, Language Classifications and the Equal Clause Protection Clause: When Is Language a
Pretext for Race or Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 481, 499 (1994).
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the discrimination experienced by Latinos is not primarily based on
being a member of a particular foreign origin group. Professor Jenny
Rivera has described how Latinos from various national origin groups
experience discrimination because of their national origin and also
85
because they are “perceived to be ‘Latinos.’” She writes,
[A]n individual of Puerto Rican, Mexican, Cuban, Dominican, or other
Latin American descent may experience different treatment not only because the person is part of a Latino [ethnic] population [group] within
the United States, but also because the person’s ancestral roots are locat86
ed within Latin America or the Latino Caribbean.

She also explains how “those hostile to Latinos have relied on Latino homogenization to facilitate the construction of all Latino sub87
Further, the English-only
classification members as foreigners.”
movement has been described as “an expression of the underlying in88
security about and prejudice towards Hispanics,” and not as a
movement against a particular national origin group. Thus, it is a
person’s perceived Latino identity, instead of their membership to a
specific national origin group, that becomes particularly relevant to
that person’s discriminatory experience. In the context of facially
race neutral laws, the discriminatory purpose that must be proved
should reflect how persons falling under the “Latino label” experience discrimination as a generalized “outside” group that is not
fragmented by national origin distinctions. Simply, the litigated discriminatory purpose should correspond to the discrimination in fact
experienced. For these reasons, heightened scrutiny based on national origin classifications is insufficient, and a clarification that the
broader Latino population group constitutes a suspect class deserving
such heightened scrutiny becomes necessary from both a social and
legal perspective.
Amid these arguments, it is crucial to note that the potential for
new discriminatory legislation based on negative reactions to the
89
growing Latino political presence is on the rise. The enormous influx of cultures has led to a growing anti-immigrant sentiment, and
nativism is emerging as a counterforce growing in reaction to an in-

85
86
87
88
89

Rivera, supra note 81, at 919, 927.
Id. at 919.
Id. at 906.
Antonio J. Califa, Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken Here, 24 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 293, 294 (1989).
Carmen B. Tigreros, Note, Constitutional Challenges to Official English Legislation, 12 ST.
JOHN’S J.L. COMMENT. 295, 318 (1996) (describing how in response to changing trends,
the majority, by passing racially biased legislation, is discriminating against immigrants).
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creasing number of minorities asserting constitutional rights.90 The
rise of the English-only movement is an example of the influence of
91
It is fueled by prejudice
such nativist and reactionary attitudes.
against Hispanics and has resulted, and will continue to result, in dis92
criminatory laws against them. To ensure equality in this dynamic
time, it is important to apply heightened scrutiny to such laws and
state actions that may discriminate against Latinos. The time is ripe
to clarify that Latinos are in fact a cognizable suspect class.
II. WHY THE COURT’S CURRENT DISCOURSE ON RACE IS PROBLEMATIC
AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW FRAMEWORK
A. The Court’s Understanding of Race as a Biological Concept Is Misleading
To definitively create a Latino cognizable class, the Court must
examine the ways in which it describes racial categories to ensure that
a Latino classification will fit within its current suspect class jurisprudence. This may consequently require the Court to understand race
in a nuanced fashion that acknowledges the diversity and dynamics of
the Latino population. Presently, however, the Court embraces a lim93
ited notion of race as a fixed, biological essence. Several examples
94
follow. To begin, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, Justice Brennan wrote that “race, like gender and illegitimacy, . . . is an
immutable characteristic which its possessors are powerless to escape
95
or set aside.” In addition, the Court asserted in Frontiero v. Richard96
son that “sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable charac97
teristic determined solely by the accident of birth.” Justice Potter
90
91

92
93

94
95

96
97

Id. at 309, 318.
Id. See Jeffrey D. Kirtner, Note, English-Only Rules and the Role of Perspective in Title VII
Claims, 73 TEX. L. REV. 871, 897 (1995) (“[T]he English-only rule must be viewed in the
context of an often hostile relationship between Hispanics and the dominant culture.”).
Califa, supra note 88, at 294 (explaining that the English-Only movement is an expression
of the underlying insecurity and prejudice towards Hispanics).
Susan Kiyomi Serrano, Rethinking Race for Strict Scrutiny Purposes: Yniguez and the Racialization of English Only, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 221, 235 (1997); see Crook, supra 26, at 20 (finding
that the Court has moved towards a “formalistic understanding of racial identity as biology, devoid of historical or social meaning”); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is
Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1991) (noting that the Court often uses a formalized
conception of race that is unrelated to ability, disadvantage, or moral culpability).
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Serrano, supra
note 93, at 235 (describing examples of the Court’s reliance on immutable, biological
race).
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
Id. at 686.
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Stewart made a similar pronouncement in his dissent in Fullilove v.
98
Klutznick, in which he wrote, “The color of a person’s skin and the
country of his origin are immutable facts that bear no relation to abil99
ity, disadvantage, [or] moral culpability.”
100
Further, in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the Court purported to recognize that “racial classifications are for the most part socio101
political, rather than biological, in nature,” but appeared unable to
reject the concept of biological race. Justice Byron White, writing for
the Court, ultimately agreed with the lower court that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 “reaches discrimination against an individual ‘because he or
she is genetically part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinc102
tive subgrouping of homo sapiens.’” Lastly, in oral arguments for As103
troline Communications Co. v. Shurbey Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc., Justice Antonin Scalia stated that a policy of granting minorities
broadcasting licenses was reduced to a question of “blood, . . . blood,
104
not background and environment.”
This conception of racial identity as a matter of biology, devoid of
social and historical meaning, is extremely problematic for two reasons. First, as will be further discussed below, the rejection of race as
a scientific concept by biologists and anthropologists is now nearly
105
complete. In fact, the idea that races exist in nature has been de106
scribed as “abandoned” by science. Second, due to a history of colonization, slavery, and intermarriage, the Latino population group
encompasses “a variety of national origins, cultures, and languages,
107
These historical dynamics
not to mention racial phenotypes.”
98
99
100
101
102

103
104

105
106

107

448 U.S. 448 (1980).
Id. at 525 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
481 U.S. 604 (1987).
Id. at 610 n.4.
Id. at 613 (quoting Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis Coll., 784 F.2d 505, 517 (3d Cir. 1986)); see
also Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1994) (describing how the Court
has been unwilling to sever race from biology).
Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)(opinions consolidated), vacated as moot,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
Oral Argument at 21:19, Astroline Commc’ns Co. v. Shurbey Broad. of Hartford, Inc., 497
U.S.
547
(No.
89-700),
available
at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/19801989/1989/1989_89_700.
See López, supra note 102, at 16; Paredes, supra note 56, at 150 (describing how most
modern scholars agree that race is socially constructed).
IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 100 (1996). See
generally STEPHAN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981); NANCY STEPAN, THE IDEA
OF RACE IN SCIENCE: GREAT BRITAIN, 1800–1960, at 170 (1982) (explaining that in the late
1950s and 1960s, “[r]ace simply no longer occupied the centre of the scientific stage as it
once had done”).
Crook, supra note 26, at 31.
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mean that the diverse Latino population will not fit within a narrow
and biological conception of race. Ultimately, if the Court continues
to rely on its flawed conception of race, it is likely to leave the status
of a Latino racial classification in jeopardy. It will be unable to clarify
that Latinos are a suspect group, like African Americans, because it
will have difficulty conceiving the Latino group as a race as the term
is currently understood. As Professor Trucios-Haynes stated, Latinos
will not be “fully protected by anti-discrimination law because they do
fit within a narrow biological definition of race that focused [sic] on
108
color and bloodlines.”
B. The Court Must Understand Race to be a Social Concept
The Court must finally accept the overwhelming scientific and anthropological research that shows that race is in fact a social con109
struct. This new understanding will align Supreme Court doctrine
with well-settled scientific findings and will consequently better accommodate a Latino racial classification for suspect class analysis.
The Court must accept that modern science has recognized that race
does not have a biological component and that racial classifications
110
are largely arbitrary. Features usually “coded to race, for example,
stature, skin color, hair texture, and facial structure, do not correlate
111
Indeed, genetic differences bestrongly with genetic variation.”
tween individuals considered to be from the same race are often
112
greater than the differences between individuals of different races.
113
Instead, races are created through social and political processes.
Race theorists Michael Omi and Howard Winant define race as “a
concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests

108
109

110
111
112

113

Trucios-Haynes, supra note 51, at 17.
See López, supra note 102, at 16 (“The rejection of race in science is now almost complete.”); Paredes, supra note 56, at 150 (describing how most modern scholars agree that
race is socially constructed).
Paredes, supra note 56, at 149 (discussing the social construction and arbitrary nature of
race).
López, supra note 102, at 15.
Paredes, supra note 56, at 149 (“[I]t has been found that differences between individuals
of the same race are often greater than the differences between the ‘average’ individuals
of different races.” (quoting Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4
(1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RECREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 5 (2011) (“These racial reclassifications did
not occur in response to scientific advances in human biology, but in response to sociopolitical imperatives.”).
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by referring to different types of human bodies.”114 Similarly, critical
race scholar Ian Haney López writes, “Race can be understood as the
historically contingent social systems of meaning that attach to ele115
ments of morphology and ancestry.”
While advocating for a shift in the conception of race may appear
dramatic, it in fact only calls for a return to the Court’s Civil Rights
116
As discussed above, in Hernandez, Chief Justice
Era sensibilities.
Warren examined the social stigma and exclusion of the Mexican
American communities in Jackson County, Texas and found that
Mexican Americans constituted a suspect class for equal protection
117
Chief Justice Warren reviewed sociopolitical factors inpurposes.
stead of relying on a finding that Mexican Americans were biologically distinct from Whites and African Americans. Moreover, because
judges play an important role in reflecting and shaping our society’s
118
dominant understanding of race, judges have a societal obligation
to align their equal protection jurisprudence with modern science.
Scholars have remarked that it is “astounding how much our percep119
tion of race is law-oriented” and have noted that courts “not only
decide disputes, they also transform particular legal controversies and
120
rights claims into larger public messages.” The Court thus has a responsibility to analyze race in a sensible way that reflects its actual social, rather than biological, foundations. Through this necessary realignment, the Court will consequently develop a framework that will
better accommodate a Latino racial classification for equal protection
purposes.

114
115
116

117
118

119
120

MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE
1960S TO THE 1990S, at 55 (2d ed. 1994) (emphasis omitted).
LÓPEZ, supra note 106, at 14.
Crook, supra 26, at 20 (“The Court has moved away from a Civil Rights Era sensibility that
understood racial subordination as a primary force in the ordering of U.S. society, toward
a formalistic understanding of racial identity as biology, devoid of historical or social
meaning.”).
See Part I.B (discussing Justice Warren’s decision in Hernandez as to the subjugation of
Latinos).
See Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby—LatCrit Theory
and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1591 (1997) (“Legislators and judges reflect society’s dominant understanding of race.”).
Id. at 1588 (describing the role of the law in the perception of race).
Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Courts and the Cultural Performance: Native Hawaiians’ Uncertain
Federal and State Law Rights to Sue, 16 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (1994).

Feb. 2014]

THE “OTHERIZED” LATINO

853

C. Searching for a New Framework to Take the Social Construction of Race
into Account
Such realignment, however, will not be easy to accomplish. The
race-as-biology definition appears ingrained in both modern Supreme Court case law and in public discourse. Properly acknowledging the social foundations of race will not be as simple as providing a
new definition of the word “race” each time that it is used. The popularized conception of race as genetics remains powerful and will
conceivably overcome efforts to merely redefine the term “race,” a
redefinition likely to be relegated to a footnote in legal opinions.
But attempting to remove the term because it is too often used erroneously is a futile pursuit as well. Race theorists Omi and Winant
posed the questions, “If the concept of race is so nebulous, can we
not dispense with it? Can we not ‘do without’ race, at least in the ‘en121
They concluded that “race” cannot be dislightened’ present?”
pensed with because “despite its uncertainties and contradictions, the
concept of race continues to play a fundamental role in structuring
122
and representing the social world.” Even if the biological basis for
123
race is an illusion, race is not imaginary. In fact, regardless of how
race is defined, it is one of the first “attributes” we notice about a per124
son when we meet them for the first time. Further, as evidenced by
the way Americans classify themselves as being of a certain race on
125
the U.S. census, race is also important for self-identification. Thus,
to properly acknowledge the social construction of race within its
suspect class analysis framework, the Court must resist both merely
redefining the term and doing away with it altogether. Accordingly,
the Court needs a new vocabulary that both signifies a clean break
from the race-as-biology concept and acknowledges the importance
of race in our society.

121
122
123
124
125

OMI & WINANT, supra note 114, at 55.
Id.
ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 5 (refuting the idea of race as an imaginary concept).
See OMI & WINANT, supra note 114, at 96.
See López, supra note 102, at 20 (“To cease speaking of races . . . would hinder our understanding of the way people think about their daily lives . . . .”).
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III. USING AN “OTHERIZATION” THEORY AS A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
FINDING RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS
A. Said’s Orientalism and How It Fits in Public and Scholarly Discourse
126
The late Edward Said, through his seminal work Orientalism, can
provide such a new vocabulary and framework for the Court. Orientalism, as both the title and the book’s dominant theory, examines the
ways in which the Western world perceives the Arab world, what he
127
terms the Orient. Said explains that in conceptualizing the Middle
East, Europe and the United States developed a clear “us” versus
“them” schema. He writes, “Orientalism was ultimately a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the
familiar (Europe, the West, ‘us’) and the strange (the Orient, the
128
East, ‘them’).” He notes that “[m]en have always divided the world
up into regions having either real or imagined distinction from each
129
other” and that no cultural distinctions were made between the various Arab countries as all Arabs were conflated into a single “Orien130
tal” category. He remarks that this binary between the West and the
East helped to establish political conceptions of “Western superiority
131
The “Oriental” becomes a “subject
and Oriental inferiority.”
132
race” and “the Other” who remains a stranger and foreigner to the
Western world of rationalism and maturity. Simply, Said’s theory of
orientalism describes how the “Oriental” becomes “otherized” by
Western society.
It is striking how well modern theories of racial formation correspond with Said’s theory of orientalism. He explains how the Arabs
came to be considered an inferior race through social and political
processes of creating imagined boundaries between different cultures. We can universalize this orientalism to examine the ways in
which our American society has “otherized” various minority groups
and found them to be a “race” by drawing clear lines between different population groups. For example, Professor López describes the
racial line drawing in which white Americans engaged in the context

126
127
128
129
130

131
132

SAID, supra note 13.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 43–44.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 37–38 (“One of the convenient things about Orientals for Cromer was that managing them, although circumstances might differ slightly here and there, was almost everywhere nearly the same.”).
Id. at 42.
Id. at 44.
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of naturalization laws in the early nineteenth century.133 He remarks
how “blacks [were] constructed as lazy, ignorant, lascivious, and criminal . . . [while whites were constructed] as industrious, knowledgeable, virtuous, and law-abiding” and how South Asians and other aliens
134
He dewere considered to be of an inferior character to whites.
scribes how “Whites fashion an identity for themselves that is the positive mirror image of the negative identity imposed on people of col135
or” much in the same way that Said describes how the Western
world constructed a negative identity for the Arab world.
Orientalism theory and the process of “otherization” thus provide
the courts with a crucial new vocabulary that recognizes the ways in
which racial distinctions have been socially constructed in our society.
It provides an intellectual tool kit from which the Court can rework
suspect class analysis. In determining which groups constitute a racial
classification deserving heightened scrutiny, the Court should no
longer ask whether a group constitutes a biological race or even
whether a group has become racialized through social and historical
processes. Instead, to determine which groups constitute a racial
classification, the Court should ask whether a group has become
“otherized” by the dominant Anglo-American society. By asking this
new question, the Court will develop an analysis that properly foregoes a biological discussion, adequately acknowledges the social construction of race, and ultimately reflects the social and political reality
of the way that diverse Americans are perceived and racially differentiated in our society. Importantly, this new “otherization” framework
will also make it likely that Latinos, a diverse population group often
described as outsiders who do not speak English and who do not
136
share American values, will be found to be a racial classification under the Equal Protection Clause. Fundamentally, this “otherization”
framework will provide the Court with the tools with which to clarify
and solidify the Latino racial classification.
137
A recent series of articles in the New York Times shows how despite the seeming theoretical nature of Said’s orientalism theory,
133
134
135
136

137

LÓPEZ, supra note 106, at 28.
Id.
Id.
See e.g., Trucios-Haynes, supra note 51, at 20 (describing how racism burdens the lives of
Latinos and how racism is evident in recent public policy debates about immigration reform in which Latinos are racialized and are viewed as non-white in the U.S. racial caste
system).
Crossing the Line Between ‘Immigrant’ and ‘American,’ ROOM FOR DEBATE, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/11/15/how-immigrants-cometo-be-seen-as-americans.
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Said’s “otherization” concerns are popular in public discourse today.
This series of articles, collectively entitled “Crossing the Line between
‘Immigrant’ and ‘American,’” asks the question, “Why are some immigrants and their descendants considered simply ‘American,’ while
138
others are still thought of as ‘outsiders’?” These articles implicitly
acknowledge a societal organization schema of “us” versus “them,”
especially in the context of Latino immigrant communities.
Moreover, the late constitutional scholar John Hart Ely echoes
Said’s schema, demonstrating that Said’s analysis is not foreign to the
equal protection academic discourse. Ely makes a distinction between “us-they” and “they-they” classifications made by white legisla139
tors when drafting laws. He argues that both of these classifications
are typically based on stereotypes but that the danger is greater in
“us-they” classifications that “we will overestimate the validity of the
proposed stereotypical classification by seizing upon the positive
140
myths about our own class and the negative myths about theirs.”
Thus, laws that draw an “us-they” distinction, particularly in the context of race, in which legislators draft laws favoring their own racial
group and disfavoring another racial group, should be subject to
141
heightened scrutiny. Ely’s analysis echoes Said’s “us” versus “them”
political framework. In addition, Said’s orientalism framework relieves scholars’ concerns that the Equal Protection Clause will only
142
properly address discrimination against African Americans because
the “otherization” framework examines the unique discriminatory
experiences of different groups to determine whether these groups
have in fact been “otherized.”
Further, Professor Bruce Ackerman has recommended that the
143
courts modernize the suspect class analysis rationale presented in

138
139
140
141

142
143

Id.
John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 933
n.85 (1973).
Id. at 934 n.85.
Id. at 933–34 n.85; see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 159–60 (1980) (“A statutory distinction built on a comparison of the qualifications of optometrists and opticians occupies an in-between position, since neither of the
groups being compared is one to which most of the legislators belong. Such a law—and
most legislative classifications are of this ‘they-they’ contour—may lack the special safeguard that a self-deprecating generalization seems to provide, but it also lacks the unusual
dangers of self-serving generalization and is consequently correctly classified as constitutionally unsuspicious.” (footnote omitted)).
See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723–24 (1985).
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Carolene Products,144 and Said’s framework fits well within his proposal.
Ackerman explains that Carolene Products predicated the need of
heightened scrutiny on the relationship between societal prejudice
145
and the historic and then-existing political exclusion of minorities.
He describes that today, however, prejudices still persist despite the
146
greater inclusiveness of our political process. Instead of doing away
with the Carolene Products rationale for offering special protection to
stigmatized racial and ethnic groups in light of their improved political participation, he suggests that courts shift focus to one of the key
147
words in the famous footnote: “prejudice.” He asserts that courts
must critically examine persistent prejudices by applying heightened
148
scrutiny to laws perhaps motivated by these prejudices. Said’s “otherization” question is an excellent mechanism for examining these
prejudices because it analyzes the ways in which groups conceptually
differentiate themselves from other groups. Thus, Said’s framework
corresponds neatly with a modernized interpretation of Carolene
Products, a case which is key to the very development of heightened
scrutiny for racial and ethnic groups.
B. Addressing Likely Critiques
Despite the ways in which Said’s theories fit within both public
discourse and current legal scholarship, a likely critique is that Said’s
anthropology, sociology, and political science research is not suited
to American judicial decision-making. The argument is that his work
is beyond the expertise of the Court and thus should not be included
in legal opinions. Returning again to Carolene Products, it is clear that
one of the rationales for developing suspect class analysis was the necessity of safeguarding “discrete and insular minorities” for whom the
149
political process offers insufficient protection. This rationale, however, is inherently a political science argument, and it turns out to be
unsound. Professor Ackerman points out that discreteness and insu144
145
146
147
148

149

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see Part II.A for an
explanation of the traditional rationale.
Ackerman, supra note 143, at 715 (describing how the Court decided to give special protection to those who had been deprived of their fair share of political influence).
Id. at 717 (“[D]espite the existence of pervasive social prejudice, minorities can and do
participate in large numbers within the normal political process.”).
Id. at 731 (“I have meant to emphasize how heavy a burden the idea of prejudice must
carry in the overall argument for Carolene Products.”).
Id. at 741 (“Carolene’s emphasis on ‘prejudice,’ however, announces a . . . different[] conception of judicial review. Here the courts do not enter as the perfecters of pluralist democracy, but as pluralism’s ultimate critics.”).
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4.
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larity will normally be a source of significant bargaining advantage,
150
not disadvantage, in the American political system. He argues that
judges should instead “protect groups that possess the opposite characteristics from the ones Carolene emphasizes—groups that are ‘anonymous and diffuse’ rather than ‘discrete and insular’” because it has
been these groups that have been “systematically disadvantaged” in
151
our democracy. Thus, in truth, the Court has been relying on political science theory in suspect class analysis for decades, and the introduction of Said’s theories will help to ensure that the political logic behind the application of heightened scrutiny to minority groups is
in fact reliable.
Further, the practice of deciding who falls into socially constructed racial categories is not foreign to the Court. In every naturalization act from 1790 until 1952, Congress restricted naturalization to
“white persons,” and the Court examined the racial construction of
152
“Whiteness.” Essentially, the Court was operating within a clear “us”
versus a “non-white them” schema. It was deciding who was not to be
considered a foreign “Other” and could therefore become naturalized. From 1909 to 1923, state and federal judges ruled that people
of Asian or mixed Asian descent did not qualify as white, but did find
153
Armenians to be white in 1909. Perplexingly, judges qualified Syrians as “white persons” in 1909, 1910, and 1915, but not in 1913 or
1914; and Asian Indians were “white persons” in 1910, 1913, 1919,
154
When making
and 1920, but not in 1909 or 1917, or after 1923.
classifications, the Supreme Court announced in 1923 that it would
use “familiar observation and knowledge” instead of “speculations of
155
The Court adopted the “understanding of the
the ethnologist.”
common man” as its interpretive principles, rejecting any role for sci156
ence in making its determinations. The Court thus recognized that
157
race was socially constructed. If the Court was equipped to turn to
popular discourse to examine who is considered “White” for naturalization procedures, then the Court is equipped to use modern political science and sociology research to decide who is considered an
“Other” under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court’s analysis
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Ackerman, supra note 143, at 723–24.
Id. at 724.
LÓPEZ, supra note 106, at 1, 19.
Id. at 67.
Id.
Id. at 92 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 90 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 9.
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used to exclude and reject can now be powerfully used to include and
protect.
Another foreseeable critique of applying Said’s orientalism theory
is that it reflects dynamic social processes that the Court disfavors.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., argued in Regents of the University of Califor158
nia v. Bakke, “[T]he mutability of a constitutional principle, based
upon shifting political and social judgments, undermines the chances
for consistent application of the Constitution from one generation to
159
He rethe next, a critical feature of its coherent interpretation.”
fused to allow the level of judicial scrutiny of racial and ethnic classi160
fications to be subject to the “ebb and flow” of “political forces.”
But as Professor Ackerman has remarked, in a clash between outdated constitutional rhetoric and the political reality, “the constitutional
161
center will not hold.” The Court ought to rely on evolving political
forces, like Said’s process of “otherization,” if relying on these dynamic processes leads to the most effective present-day protection of minority groups. Said’s framework will be based on modern experiences instead of outdated conceptions of race as biology. And as Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote,
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy . . . have had a good deal more to do than the syllo162
gism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.

To follow Holmes’s advice, Said’s “otherization” framework will
acknowledge the civil rights necessities of our time and the prevalent
theories about how we create divisions between population groups in
order to better shape our governing equal protection framework.
Thus, Said’s “otherization” theory is an effective framework from
which the Court can solidify and maintain a Latino racial classification.
CONCLUSION
As Omi and Winant pronounced, “Race will always be at the cen163
The goal of this Comment has
ter of the American experience.”
been to highlight the particular challenges to the Court’s creation of
158
159
160
161
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a Latino racial classification and to propose a new framework for the
Court to use in clarifying the equal protection status of the Latino
population. Edward Said’s orientalism theory provides a coherent
way for the Court to examine the discrimination experienced by Hispanics and to protect the group from stigmatizing legislation. His
theory asks the fundamental question about whether the Latino
group has been “otherized,” thus deserving a special racial classification and heightened scrutiny. The hope is that this Comment will
contribute to the academic dialogue that, in the words of one race
theorist, attempts to account “for the role of racism in American law
and that works toward the elimination of racism as part of a larger
164
goal of eliminating all forms of subordination.”
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